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Since  1995  universal  healthcare  coverage  has  been  provided  in  Israel  through  National
Health  Insurance  (NHI).  Although  the  country  has  lower  rates  of  health  spending  than  most
OECD countries,  the NHI Law  stipulates  that a broad  beneﬁts  package  will  be  provided  by
four competing  Health  Plans  (HPs).  These  third-party  payers  manage  healthcare  utiliza-
tion  and  cost  through  mechanisms  that  affect  both  provider  and  consumer  behavior.  Cost
Containment  is  one  of their  main  organizational  objectives.  The  Ministry  of  Health  (MoH)
supervises  HPs  to ensure  that  they  provide  their  members  with  adequate  healthcare  of  high
quality  in accordance  with  the NHI Law  and  uphold  the  principles  of  efﬁciency  and equity.
In this  paper  we  report  on  a  policy  instrument  recently  introduced  by  the  MoH  which
enables  it  to share  some  of its  responsibility  for  supervision  with  the  insureds.  This  policy
instrument  is  a website  launched  in  2014 that gives  access  to transparent  information  about
the coverage  of  the  NHI and  voluntary  health  insurance  (VHI)  beneﬁts  packages.  The  idea
is to empower  insureds  with  knowledge  and  awareness  of their  rights  and  eligibility  to
beneﬁts,  so  they  can  demand  them  from  the  HPs  and/or  private  insurers;  if refused,  they
can refer  the  case  to  the supervisor  (the  MoH).  This  policy  instrument  addresses  market
failures  related  to information  asymmetry  and  can  potentially  improve  competition  among
the HPs  and  within  the  VHI market.
©  2014  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  Ireland  Ltd. This  is  an  open  access  article  under
the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).. IntroductionFollowing the example of other OECD countries, Israel
ses digital media to improve access to information about
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recently launched a brand new website that is accessible
to all residents of Israel (http://call.gov.il/). This website
contains independent, up-to-date information on aspects
of health insurance (public and voluntary). In this paper,
we report on this policy instrument and its possible
consequences within an original conceptual and analysis
framework.This policy tool may  be of interest to healthcare sys-
tems that are facing the challenge of supervising third party
payers (i.e., health plans, insurers) to ensure that they man-
age the utilization and expenditure of healthcare services
 access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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according to the law and watch for selection and moral haz-
ard risks. For example, there is evidence that countries such
as the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and Switzerland are
facing this challenge [1].
Our analysis and conceptual framework may  be useful
to policymakers and researchers in other OECD countries
that have launched similar websites, who wish to have a
better understanding of the broad consequences of this
tool. For example, Italy, Switzerland and France operate
similar websites. In the USA, as part of the ACA the website
for the new federal health insurance marketplace (Health-
Care.gov), as well as state websites for states running their
own marketplaces, were launched to help individuals shop
for coverage [2]. To the best of our knowledge, no studies
have been conducted to evaluate these websites and their
outcomes.
2. Background: the health system in Israel
Since 1995, Israel has had a National Health Insurance
(NHI) system that provides a beneﬁts package to all citizens
and permanent residents of Israel, which the government
updates each year. Compared to other OECD countries,
Israel has had low health spending in the last decade [3].
Nevertheless, health outcomes have improved [4] and pub-
lic satisfaction from health plans has remained high [5].
Every year the government determines the level of
funding for NHI, which is ﬁnanced predominantly from
public sources. NHI funds are collected primarily via payroll
and general tax revenues. MoH  data show that the funding
does not grow at the same pace as the population or the
health cost index [6]. The share of public ﬁnancing declined
to 61% of the total health expenditure (THE) in 2012, way
below the OECD average of 72%. Accordingly, the share of
private ﬁnancing increased to 39%, which is one of the high-
est rates among OECD countries [7]. According to data from
the Ministries of Health and Finance, this increase is due to
a sharp increase in spending on voluntary health insurance
(VHI) premiums [8,9].
Payment and provision of care are the responsibility of
the health plans (HPs). Every permanent resident is free
to choose from among four competing, nonproﬁt HPs (see
Fig. 1. The Israeli health insurance market (THE: total heal
Source: [6,13–15] and author’s adaptation. Policy 118 (2014) 279–284
Fig. 1). The HPs are required by the NHI Law to provide
all their members with the services in the beneﬁts package
and to ensure reasonable accessibility and availability. They
receive public funding for managing and providing these
services mainly through prospective payments according
to a risk-adjusted capitation formula that considers the
insureds’ age, sex and place of residence (periphery/center
of the country). Only small co-payments are required for
pharmaceuticals, physician visits, and certain diagnostic
exams (which constituted 6.45% of the HPs’ revenue in
2013).
The four HPs are third-party payers that manage the
utilization and costs of healthcare services through mech-
anisms that affect the behavior of both provider and
consumer, taking into account three key organizational
objectives: cost containment, quality improvement, and
equity promotion [10]. Cost containment is one of the
HPs’ main organizational objectives. Their efforts to con-
trol costs include reviewing the utilization of hospital care,
arranging discounted bulk purchasing from hospitals and
pharmaceutical manufactures, and the creation of a net-
work of primary care providers throughout the country
[11]. Other efforts include implementing an information
technology infrastructure for monitoring utilization and
expenditures at the level of physicians [12].
The voluntary health insurance (VHI) market in Israel
offers two products: supplemental insurance (SI) provided
by the HPs and commercial insurance (CI) provided by for-
proﬁt commercial insurance companies (see Fig. 1). SI is
a collective insurance plan that offers a standard package
to all policyholders, with fees determined solely by age.
HPs provide the SI plans in addition to the mandatory
health basket they provide under the NHI Law. Commercial
insurance companies market both collective and individ-
ual policies, tailored to the purchaser’s preferences. Both
SI and CI have a complementary and a supplementary role
in the health system. VHI policies cover (a) services that
are not included in the NHI basic health care package (for
example, dental care or alternative medicine); (b) services
that are covered by the NHI, but only to a limited extent
(for example, in vitro fertilization (IVF) and physiotherapy);
(c) reimbursement for care purchased in the private sector
th expenditure; OOP: out of pocket expenditures).
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hat provide enhanced choice of provider, faster access or
mproved facilities. They enable policyholders to use the
rivate system for services that may  also be available in
he public system, thereby facilitating rapid access, choice
f provider and improved amenities. The VHI does not
over or reduce co-payments in the public system. For more
etails on the VHI market, see the following section.
.1. Concerns about the managed-care model in Israel
The managed care model may  create incentives for the
Ps to contain utilization and costs, either directly through
election of low-risk enrollees, or indirectly by rationing
rovision of expensive coverage [16–18]. The ﬁnancial
nvironment in Israel is one of strict rationing of fund-
ng for the public health system. The Ministry of Finance
MoF) sets the annual government funding level for NHI.
he MoF  is also inﬂuential in healthcare decisions that have
udgetary implications, such as specifying nationwide con-
racts of physicians’ salaries or setting CAPs on hospital
evenues from HPs [19]. Therefore, the incentives for cost
ontainments by the HPs are intensiﬁed in Israel. The cost
ontainment objective on the one hand, and the inability
o add signiﬁcant resources to the public system on the
ther, raise concerns that insureds may  be (1) deterred
rom obtaining adequate healthcare or (2) persuaded to
urchase and use VHI. That might be related to informa-
ion asymmetry in which the insureds are not aware of their
ights and coverage within the NHI, and are therefore more
usceptible to decisions made by the HPs.
One example of evidence of the above concerns is the
sraeli VHI market, which is larger than that of most OECD
ountries: in 2012, 83% of the adult population had SI
nd 42% had CI (see Fig. 1). In 2010, the only countries
n which the percentage of the population covered by VHI
as larger than in Israel were the Netherlands and France
89% and 86%, respectively) [20,21]. Furthermore, there is
ual coverage: 93% of those who own CI also own SI [5].
n addition, household spending as a percentage of THE on
I increased by 70% and on CI by 90% between 2002 and
011 [8,9]. Accordantly, about 50% report that they were
onﬁdent or very conﬁdent that they would receive the
est and most effective treatment. Only 40% reported that
hey were conﬁdent they would be able to afford the treat-
ent needed. In these two measures, Israel had the lowest
core of all 11 countries in the 2010 Commonwealth Fund
urvey [5]. Finally, some evidence of forgoing certain ser-
ices is reﬂected in the experience of sicker adults. A higher
ercentage of sicker adults than of other adults reported
ifﬁculty or great difﬁculty getting medical care after day-
ime reception hours; had gone without a service because
f the distance; and had had difﬁculty or had had to make
reat efforts in order to receive a referral or voucher [5].
. The website as a policy tool
.1. RationaleOne of the main objectives of the MoH’s HP Supervision
epartment is to ensure that the HPs provide their mem-
ers with adequate, high quality healthcare in accordance Policy 118 (2014) 279–284 281
with the NHI law and uphold the principles of efﬁciency and
equity. However, as in other third-party-payer healthcare
systems, this is challenging.
The Supervision Department has created a tool that
shares part of the Ministry’s responsibility for supervi-
sion with the insureds themselves. The tool helps insureds
to take responsibility for their own  healthcare. It enables
them to make informed decisions by providing access, via
an open website, to transparent information about the ser-
vices covered in the NHI and SI packages to which they are
entitled.
The Supervision Department assumes that once people
are informed of their rights and eligibility for beneﬁts, they
have the power to demand them from the HPs or private
insurers, and, if refused, can refer the case to the supervisor.
The same goes for healthcare providers (such as physicians
and hospitals): once better informed, providers can ensure
that the service package is fully provided to those entitled
to it, thereby reducing information asymmetry among all
players.
Digital media have empowered consumers in general,
particularly in the area of healthcare. They have changed
the balance between consumers and providers and have
enabled consumers to demand their rights, by making them
better able to request the services to which they are entitled
[22–25]. Furthermore, information allowing a full compar-
ison between HPs and VHI policies is available. All this will
improve competition among the HPs and VHI since in Israel,
all citizens and permanent residents are free to choose from
among the four HPs and there are no waiting periods in SI
or NHI while moving from one HP to another.
3.2. Content
The MoH’s Supervision Department has launched a
website called Call-Habriut (http://call.gov.il/), a Hebrew
play on words implying “all health,” “call for health” and
“voice of health. “The website includes independent, open,
up-to-date information regarding the services available
through NHI and SI and eligibility for them (i.e., informa-
tion on thousands of services and medical technologies,
conditions of eligibility for them and the process by which
eligibility is exercised, co-payments set by HP and SI, and
other legal information). In the near future, the MoH  plans
to include information regarding CI policies in Call-Habriut,
and to translate its contents into additional languages such
as Arabic and Russian. Any individual can check his/her eli-
gibility for coverage and browse for information by name
of service; by category (e.g., “diagnostic testing” or “med-
ication”); or by area of interest such as “pregnancy and
delivery,” “diabetes” or “severe diseases” (see Fig. 2).
The contents of the Call-Habriut website are regularly
updated by the website’s editors, who  receive information
from key staff members in each department at the MoH
and the HPs, who  report every change, reform or directive.
According to the project manager, this is the best source
of up-to-date information in the system. Call-Habriut has
been developed online since 2013 and became available
to the public in its current format in June 2014.A cam-
paign to advertise the website to the public was  launched
on October 21st, 2014 and has been constantly monitored
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ation aFig. 2. Summary of the types of inform
since then. Within the ﬁrst week of ofﬁcial existence, more
than 81 thousand people visited the website and the smart-
phone application, viewed about 460 thousand pages, and
downloaded 1000 documents. Visitors spend 2.5 min  on
average on the website.
4. Expected outcomes
4.1. Strengths
In addition to empowering insureds, during the plan-
ning process the MoH’s Supervision Department predicted
the following outcomes:
1. Accurate deﬁnition of the NHI beneﬁts package:
already in the early stages of building the Call-Habriut
database, the MoH  identiﬁed an unexpected positive
outcome: for the ﬁrst time since the enactment of the
NHI law in 1995, the services and technology pro-
vided through the beneﬁts package had to be deﬁned
more accurately in order to be listed on the website.
This in itself has far-reaching legal effects. Further-
more, fully understanding the contents of a country’s
beneﬁts package is not a trivial task in Israel or other
OECD countries. It is rather a need that researchers from
many European countries identiﬁed and attempted to
meet in the past decade in a cross-country study called
“HealthBASKET” [26]. This Israeli experience can intro-
duce others, such as Portugal, Italy, Austria and Greece,
which did not participate in this project, to an innova-
tive way to fully outline the contents of their beneﬁts
package.
2. Restraining private expenditure: over the past decade,
Israel has witnessed a trend of rapid growth rates in pri-
vate spending and VHI ownership. In its “medium-term
plan,” the MoH  set itself the goal of reducing growth in
private spending and strengthening the public system
and public trust in it. The website was created, in part,vailable on the Call-Habriut website.
as a tool to strengthen this policy: Israelis lack knowl-
edge about the coverage to which they are entitled in
each type of insurance and how to claim for the services
covered. This problem is reﬂected in non-utilization
of services covered by NHI, or over-utilization of VHI,
as well as distrust of the public system. Yet the MoH
believes that the Israeli NHI beneﬁts package is broad
and comprehensive. Therefore, providing transparent
information about the NHI coverage should increase
utilization and possibly increase public trust and con-
ﬁdence in the public system, if people ﬁnd the coverage
to be better than expected or experienced.
3. Enhanced competition among insurers: the NHI Law
guarantees residents of Israel free choice of HP. However,
very few Israelis switch from one to another (3.5% from
2010-2012) [5]. Call-Habriut enables insureds to com-
pare different aspects of HPs – for example, additional
services or technologies provided besides the basic NHI
beneﬁts package, or different co-payment and discount
rates. The tool can enhance competition among HPs and
thus improve quality of care. Call-Habriut might also
improve competition in the VHI market, both among the
HPs and between SI and CI. Consumers will be able to
make wiser choices when considering whether to pur-
chase/keep VHI, once they are aware of the beneﬁts in
the NHI package as well as those covered by SI and CI.
Greater public awareness should help slow down the
expansion of the VHI market because, consumers will
be able to purchase the most suitable policy or give up
dual coverage.
4.2. Weaknesses
The main undesirable outcomes of the website are:1. This consumer-empowering tool may  limit the HPs’
management ﬂexibility and its capacity to manage care.
For example, 60% of the medications that are in the NHI
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basket currently have to be approved by the HPs’ admin-
istration every time a member applies for coverage. The
website empowers the insureds to request the medica-
tions and HPs are less able to deny claims;
. It may  also increase utilization of services within the
public system (i.e., by patients who would otherwise
have forgone the services or as a result of increased
physician referrals) thereby increasing public spend-
ing without reducing it in the private system. In this
case, not only would the private system and pri-
vate expenditure keep growing, so too would public
expenditure.
. The success of the tool is based on the extent of its use;
especially by vulnerable populations (e.g., the elderly,
less educated, poor), who may  not have the prerequi-
site access to internet services. In 2011, about 30% of all
households in Israel did not pay for internet services in
their homes, which would limit their ability to use the
tool. Nevertheless, the website can be easily accessed
via smartphones, which overcomes part of the prob-
lem. People without access to the internet can also take
advantage of the website by having their physician use
it on their behalf.
. Policy process
The Call-Habriut website is a low-cost internal project
so far cost around D 106,000) that was easy to incorpo-
ate into the Supervision Department’s annual work-plan.
nce approved by the MoH  director general, this low
udget tool did not need the approval of other bodies
uch as the government, the MoF  or the Knesset (parlia-
ent) to be initiated. Usually the MoF  has great inﬂuence
ver other ministries since it allocates the national bud-
et. In this case, the MoF  was not involved with the
all-Habriut project, which made it possible for the MoH
o construct and implement the website within eighteen
onths. Within the MoH  there was no overt opposition
o the project. When the project was launched, the MoH
equested information from the HPs regarding their VHI
overage and services provided within the NHI. The HPs’
epresentatives were initially opposed to collaboration
ue to the above-mentioned weaknesses, such as limita-
ion of their management ﬂexibility and their capacity to
anage care. The MoH, eager to implement the website,
athered all the information about the coverage indepen-
ently.
When the HPs realized that the website would be
aunched in any case, they were more willing to cooperate,
eeming it more advantageous than refraining from doing
o. The HPs then examined the information gathered by the
oH and added more detailed information, also agreeing
pdate it on a regular base. Suppliers and service providers,
uch as hospitals, physicians and social workers, were not
nvolved in the planning or implementation of the web-
ite, but are assumed to support the tool as it broadens the
pportunity to provide service.
The current phase in the policy process is that the
oH  has invited the comptroller of insurance at the
oF to gather the information regarding the CI policies Policy 118 (2014) 279–284 283
and to ask for the commercial insurance companies’
collaboration.
6. Conclusions
Prima facie, it is not clear whether Call-Habriut website
should be deﬁned as a policy instrument. Nevertheless, this
project introduces a new and innovative governmental tool
into the system. The tool is based on transparent informa-
tion regarding the contents of the NHI, SI and (eventually)
CI beneﬁts packages to which the insureds are entitled. This
up-to-date information is available on an open website and
is impartial and independent from insurers. In this way, the
MoH  is offering the public a way of proactively exercising
their rights to healthcare.
Furthermore, thanks to greater transparency, the
project may  have a positive impact on reducing impor-
tant market failures caused by information asymmetry. By
increasing the insureds’ awareness and knowledge about
the beneﬁts package to which they are entitled, the HPs
will be less able to skimp (i.e. under-provision of services to
severity patients [17]). This would reduce adverse selection
in NHI as well as in SI. In addition, a knowledgeable pub-
lic could enhance competition in the market, and increase
trust and conﬁdence in the public system. The main possi-
ble undesirable consequence is an increase in total health
expenditure (private and public) due to increased utiliza-
tion and the HPs’ limited management ﬂexibility.
The success or impact of the reform on the Israeli health-
care system depends on the extent that insureds use the
website and become aware of the information available,
and make wiser and more educated choices. To ensure that
the website achieves its objectives, the Supervision Depart-
ment intends to evaluate its impact through an impartial
study.
To summarize, this project motivates change from a
bottom-up perspective. It has the potential to serve as a
viable, non-expensive and innovative tool that comple-
ments the broad policy of addressing market failures with
top-down approaches.
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